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WEST ONE TRUST COMPANY, 
Personal Representative for the 
Estate of Merlin R. Morrison, 
Sr., 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
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Case No, 920533-CA 
Priority No. 16 
REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees assert that the trial court was correct in refus-
ing to look beyond the four corners of the deeds to determine the 
intent of partners Merlin R. Morrison, Jr. ("Morrison, Jr.") and 
Merlin R. Morrison, Sr. ("Morrison, Sr.") Appellees reach that 
conclusion by virtually ignoring the Utah Partnership Act and by 
relying on cases which are inapposite. Under the clear language 
of the Act, properties purchased with partnership funds belong to 
the partnership, unless a contrary intention appears. This is 
true regardless of the record title. The facts are uncontro-
verted in this case that the properties in question were pur-
chased by Morrison Sr. and Morrison Jr. with partnership funds. 
Appellees may dispute that the facts are uncontroverted on this 
issue, but at the very least, there exists a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the properties were purchased with 
partnership funds. 
The next issue of whether there is sufficient evidence to 
rebut the presumption that the properties belonged to the part-
nership also raises genuine issues of material fact. Appellees 
are saddled with the burden of showing a contrary intent. 
Appellees never met this burden because the trial court, refusing 
to look beyond the four corners of the deeds, never reached the 
issue of intent. Courts uniformly hold that record title alone 
does not establish intent, a point appellees do not dispute. 
Because there are genuine issues of material fact in this case, 
the trial court clearly erred in granting summary judgment for 
appellees. 
Appellees suggest that West One is precluded from making 
arguments concerning the use of partnership funds to purchase the 
real properties. Appellees are dead wrong. West One persistent-
ly argued to the trial court the legal principles, theory and 
policy that embody the Utah Partnership Act -- that partnership 
property belongs to the partnership unless a contrary intention 
is shown. Courts uniformly hold that omitting a specific cita-
tion to a statute does not preclude a party from raising the 
statute on appeal. In this case, omission of a specific citation 
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to the Act is inconsequential. Appellant properly cites on 
appeal the statute and its underlying principles.1 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellees argue that West One's reliance on the legal 
principles underlying the Partnership Act is misplaced because 
there is no evidence that partnership funds were used to purchase 
the three properties in question. The record shows otherwise. 
As cited in appellant's brief, there are numerous references 
to Morrison, Jr.'s testimony that he and his father, Morrison, 
Sr., financed and operated the properties like they did their 
other business enterprises -- as a "partnership." (Depo. of 
Morrison, Jr. at 25, 68-69 & 76; R. 125.) The partners had a 
30-year partnership where they would contribute capital and 
In their description of the course of proceedings, appellees state that the Morrisons1 
motion to restrain West One's prosecution of this appeal was based on the fact that West 
One had failed to consult the heirs with regard to the appeal. (Appellees' Brief, p. 3.) 
This statement is inaccurate and unsupported by the record. Contrary to appellees' 
statement, the supporting memorandum to the Morrisons' motion (attached to Appellees' 
Brief, addendum No. 2) does not even mention, let alone assert, that West One had failed 
to fully consult the heirs. In fact, Gilbert Bean, personal Trust Officer of West One Bank, 
in the fall of 1991, notified by letter the heirs regarding the appeal. 
Appellees also attempt to create the impression that this appeal is contrary to the 
wishes of the majority of the heirs and only serves to waste the estate's assets. Appellees' 
portrayal is disingenuous. Even if only one heir requested West One to appeal the trial 
court's order, West One would be obligated to do so because the trial court was wrong. If 
West One declined to appeal the trial court's order, it may well be in breach of its 
fiduciary duties to the heir(s). 
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services to finance and operate numerous business enterprises. 
In Morrison, Jr.'s own words, they "were always partners . . . ." 
(Depo. of Morrison, Jr. at 25, Addendum No. 2, Appellant?s 
Brief.) Their partnership activities included the purchase of 
the three subject real properties. In his affidavit, Morrison, 
Jr. testifies that he and Morrison, Sr. "jointly purchased" the 
three real properties and that "various tax returns were filed 
indicating a partnership" between them. (R. at 125) (emphasis 
added). Morrison, Jr.'s testimony is unequivocal that he regard-
ed the purchase of the three real properties as another business 
enterprise of the partners and that the subject properties 
belonged to the partnership. 
Appellees' description of Morrison, Jr.fs and Morrison, 
Sr.'s partnership relationship is confusing. Appellees assert 
that because Morrison, Jr. and Morrison Sr. contributed half of 
the funds to purchase the real properties they were "co-owners," 
not partners. Appellees state that "Mr. Morrison, Jr.!s testimo-
ny make [sic] it clear that he uses the term [partnership] as 
synonymous with "co-owners." (Appellees' Brief, p. 9) (footnote 
omitted). Appellees also state that "West One concedes that Mr. 
Morrison, Jr. contributed half of the funds to purchase the 
properties and in doing so must concede that the properties were 
not purchased with partnership funds." (Appellees1 Brief, p. 
13. ) 
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Appellees' logic is specious, and reflects a misunderstand-
ing of what a partnership is under the Utah Partnership Act. As 
stated in Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3, "[a] partnership is an associ-
ation of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners, a business 
for profit." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-3 (1992) (emphasis added). 
Appellees' own description of Morrison, Jr.'s and Morrison, Sr.'s 
association contains a critical partnership element. 
Appellees needlessly point out that Morrison, Jr.Ts testimo-
ny did not accurately explain the full implications of a "part-
nership." Morrison, Jr. testified that he thought he owned a 50% 
interest in the properties. (R. at 125.) Appellees recite 
general principles of partnership law that the partnership 
actually holds a 100% interest in partnership property and two 
partners each hold a 50% interest in the partnership. 
(Appellees' Brief, p. 9-10.) Appellees glean to this error in 
Morrison, Jr.'s testimony to show that Morrison, Jr. could not 
have intended that the properties belonged to the partnership. 
Appellees overstate the significance of this testimony. Morri-
son, Jr.'s description of partner ownership is understandable in 
light of what appellees characterize as his "layman's" under-
standing of partnership law. Morrison, Jr.'s testimony, however, 
in no way evidences that he did not intend a partnership in the 
legal sense. His testimony is clear that the indicia of a 
partnership existed between he and Morrison, Sr.: the two men 
had a long association as co-owners to finance and operate 
5 
businesses for profit, including the purchase of the real proper-
ties . 
Because the partners purchased the properties with partner-
ship funds, the trial court should have, as urged by West One, 
looked beyond the four corners of the deeds to determine the 
partners' intent. Appellees respond that "West One also attempts 
to have the Court speculate as to the intent of Mr. Morrison, Jr. 
. . . " (Brief of Appellees, p. 9.) Appellees misunderstand West 
One's point. West One is not attempting to have this Court 
speculate as to Morrison, Jr.'s intent. That obviously is not 
this Court's role. West One is simply marshaling facts to show 
that the partners regarded the property as partnership property, 
or, at the very least, that a genuine issue of material fact 
exists as to whether the properties were purchased with partner-
ship funds. It is the trial court's responsibility to weigh the 
evidence and determine the partners' intent. The trial court, 
however, refused to look beyond the record title to reach the 
issue of intent. This refusal was an error of law. Accordingly, 
the trial court's order of summary judgment should be reversed 
and this case should be remanded for a trial on the factual 
issues that are germane to the disposition of the subject real 
properties. 
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II. 
THE ISSUES ON APPEAL WERE SUFFICIENTLY 
RAISED IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Appellees argue that West One failed to argue to the trial 
court the theory that the three properties at issue belonged to 
the partnership because the properties were purchased with 
partnership funds. Appellees either ignore or overlook numerous 
references to this theory in the record below. The issue of the 
existence of a partnership and the use of partnership funds to 
purchase the properties was briefed by West One in its Memorandum 
in Opposition to appellee's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
The issue also permeated the discussion at oral argument and is 
central to the decision at hand.2 
In James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), this 
Court held that 
[a] matter is sufficiently raised if it has 
been submitted to the trial court and the 
trial court has had the opportunity to make 
findings of fact or law. 
Id. at 801. In the present case, West One sufficiently raised 
the issue that property purchased with partnership funds belongs 
to the partnership although it did not cite to a specific statu-
tory provision. 
"Appellees state that West One has made "several arguments" which were not made to 
the trial court. (Appellees' Brief, pp. 10-12.) The only such argument identified by 
appellees was that concerning the use of partnership funds to purchase the subject real 
properties. The other argument(s) to which appellees refer are a mystery. 
7 
The lack of a specific statutory citation to the trial court 
does not, however, preclude West One from citing to that statute 
on appeal. General reference to the legal principle(s) underly-
ing the statute sufficiently preserves the relevant issues. 
Appellate courts uniformly adhere to this principle. In Danes v. 
Automobile Underwriters, Inc., 307 N.E.2d 902 (Ind. Ct. App, 
1974), the Indiana court was faced with a situation very similar 
to the one at hand. In Danes, the plaintiff, who was acting as 
guardian for her minor child, sought a declaration that a previ-
ous release of her daughter's claims against an uninsured motor-
ist pursuant to a settlement entered into by the plaintiff be 
declared void. Although the plaintiff argued that the release 
was "'void ab initio' as against public policy," the plaintiff 
failed to cite to an Indiana statute which specifically required 
that a compromise or settlement of a minor's claim is valid only 
when approved by the court. Id. at 903. The plaintiff first 
referred to the statute itself in the plaintiff's appellate 
brief. Although the defendant insurer asserted that the citation 
of the statute gave rise to a new issue on appeal which was not 
before the trial court, the appellate court disagreed stating 
that the plaintiff 
persistently argued that a minor's claim may 
not be compromised or settled without court 
approval . . . . Questions within the issues 
and before the trial court are before the 
appellee (sic) court, and new arguments and 
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authorities may with strict priority be 
brought forward. 
Id. at 905 (emphasis added). The court further mentioned that 
[i]t is clear that: " . . . the courts of a 
state will take judicial notice of its own 
public statutes and that it is accordingly 
unnecessary to plead them or to set out the 
contents or substance thereof." 
Id. at 905 (quoting Chicago & Calument Dist. Transit Co., Inc. v. 
Stravatzakes, 156 N.E.2d 902, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 1959)).3 
In Wojt v. Chimacum School Dist. No. 49, 516 P.2d 1099 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1973), the Washington court similarly held that a 
failure specifically to cite to the statute did not preclude the 
appellant from bringing the statute to the court's attention 
during the appeal. Id. at 1103 n.4. In Wojt, the plaintiff 
challenged the legal sufficiency of the stated causes for his 
discharge from one of the defendant's schools, but failed to cite 
to the court a statute that required the promulgation of evalua-
tive guidelines concerning teaching and other classroom-related 
performance. In holding that the plaintiff could cite to the 
court the statute for the first time on appeal, the court stated 
that the primary issue before the trial court was the legal 
sufficiency of the stated causes for discharge and, accordingly, 
"[a]11 statutes and authorities which bear upon the issue of the 
In addition, although the court noted that had plaintiff?s counsel specifically called 
the trial court's attention to the statute the trial court might well have resolved the 
matter differently, the court put no weight on the counsel's oversight. Danes, 307 N.E.2d 
at 905. 
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sufficiency of the causes are therefore properly before this 
court." Id. (emphasis in original). 
Other courts have also held that the failure to specifically 
cite the statute at trial did not preclude its citation during 
appeal. See, e.g., Independent Nat1! Bank v. Westmoor Elec. 
Inc., 795 P.2d 210 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (where defendant failed 
to cite Arizona statute providing for set-off, court found that 
defendant's general argument concerning set-off sufficiently 
preserved argument for appeal); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 686 
P.2d 79 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984) (general reference to statute of 
limitations, but failure specifically to cite statute, did not 
preclude its use during appeal). 
In the present case, although West One did not cite Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-5 to the trial court, West One did persistently 
argue the theory of section 48-1-5. West One's primary argument 
was that the trial court should look at the intent of the part-
ners because the properties belonged to the partnership. The 
theory of section 48-1-5, was thereby preserved for argument on 
appeal. During the oral argument of defendants' motion for 
summary judgment, the following discourse took place: 
Mr. Sessions: We're saying: No, wait a 
minute. We're entitled to look behind the 
four corners of the documents; number one, 
because Mr. Morrison was in a partnership 
with his son, the partnership that they had 
covered five separate business transactions 
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The Court: So if you prove there!s a part-
nership--! fm just trying to follow along, 
suppose you are able to prove there was a 
partnership and these properties belonged in 
this partnership; why couldn't they still be 
in joint tenancy and then be back to where we 
are now, and that is interpreting the lan-
guage of the deed? 
Mr. Sessions: The reason why is if in fact 
it is a 50/50 partnership, just for purposes 
of argument, in fact 50 percent of the prop-
erty that is owned in the partnership would 
belong to the estate. 
The Court: Why would it if--I agree with you 
on a general basis, 50/50 partnership, they 
each owned 50 percent. But if they agreed to 
hold some of the real property in joint ten-
ancy, why can't they do that so that upon the 
death of one of them it just passes along? 
Mr. Sessions: I think this is the key and 
the answer, as least as I view the answer. 
The easy and quick answer is yes, you can 
hold property in joint tenancy, no question 
about that. But if the parties really in-
tended that it wasn't to be joint property at 
all in the sense that it passed to the survi-
vor upon the death of the first to die, but 
it was intended by the parties to be some-
thing else in this case, partnership proper-
ty. Then if it is the intention of the par-
ties that ought to be enforced. 
The Court: All you've shown here is they 
intended this be part of the partnership--
Mr. Sessions: Exactly. 
(Trans., pp. 28-32, Addendum No. 1.) 
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The above discussion between the trial court and West One?s 
counsel shows counsel's emphasis on the fact that the properties 
were partnership properties. Accordingly, the court was com-
pelled to ascertain the intent of the partners in order to 
determine the disposition of the properties. There is no ques-
tion that the trial court understood that West One was arguing 
that the property was purchased with partnership funds and is 
presumed to be partnership property, absent a contrary intent. 
As noted above, the court asked: 
[SJuppose that you are able to prove that it was a 
partnership and these properties belonged in this 
partnership; why couldn't they still be in joint 
tenancy and then be back to where we are now, and 
that is interpreting the language of the deed? 
All you've shown here is that they intended 
that this be part of the partnership . . . . 
(Trans, at 29-31, Addendum No. 1.) The court further stated that 
. . . just because someone intended that to 
say something different, if it's clear, I'm 
not sure the law allows me to go behind and 
change it. But Mr. Sessions is saying, yes, 
that's true. Citing the case, the fact these 
were partnership assets injects a new element 
in this. 
(Trans, at 39, Addendum No. 1.) 
The trial court was well aware of West One's argument that 
because the property was partnership property, the property 
belonged to the partnership absent a contrary intent. The 
court's discussion with counsel during argument demonstrates this 
12 
awareness. Appellees' argument to the contrary wholly lacks 
merit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in West One's briefs, West One 
respectfully submits that the trial court's summary judgment be 
reversed and the case be remanded for a factual determination 
whether the appellees can rebut the presumption that the three 
subject real properties were and are properties of the partner-
ship. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 1992. 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
Clark'W. Sess: 
Dean C. Andreassen 
Michael T. Roberts 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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